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ABSTRACT
The ubiquity of cell phones in today’s society has forced
courts to change or dismiss established, but inapplicable
analytical frameworks. Two such frameworks in the school setting
are regulations of student speech and of student searches. This
Article traces the constitutional jurisprudence of both First
Amendment off-campus speech protection and Fourth Amendment
search standards as applied to the school setting. It then analyzes
how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley v. California complicates
both areas. Finally, it proposes a pragmatic solution: by
recognizing a categorical First Amendment exception for
“substantial threats” against the school community, courts could
accommodate students’ constitutional rights while upholding
school administrators’ ability to maintain a safe environment.

INTRODUCTION
Cell phone technology has changed almost every aspect of the
modern age. Cell phones provide a means to access and store vast amounts
of information and to communicate with people around the world. They
are also popular across age groups, including among children and teens
who use them as a primary mode of communication and entertainment.
Because cell phone users keep their phones on their person, this poses
several problems in the school setting, where traditionally school
administrators can regulate certain student speech and conduct some
searches of student belongings. Courts have failed to adopt a consistent
standard for school administrators’ scope of authority over off-campus
speech. Although the Supreme Court has developed a test for assessing the
reasonableness of a search in school, it has not clarified how cell phones
fit within that test. This Article traces the constitutional contours both of
student speech and student searches, identifies the nuanced issues posed
by cell phones, and proposes a solution that honors the underlying
concerns on all sides: abolish the inconsistent standards of authority for
†
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off-campus speech and recognize a narrowly defined First Amendment
exception for “substantial threats” to the school community.

I. OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Supreme Court’s Student Speech Cases
The Supreme Court first addressed student free speech rights
within public schools in the seminal case, Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District. 1 In Tinker, school officials
suspended three students from school when the students refused to remove
their black armbands, which they wore in protest of the Vietnam War. 2
Afterwards, the students sued, claiming the school had violated their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech. 3 The case reached the Supreme
Court, which found in favor of the students and their right to protest. It
held that, although school officials may control conduct in the schools, any
regulation must be consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards
and be motivated “by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.” 4 Indeed, the court proclaimed, “[i]t can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”5
Despite the favorable ruling, the Court ultimately curtailed
students’ speech rights in other contexts. In weighing the competing
interests, the Court ruled that a school may interfere with a student’s
speech if the school can show that the speech would “materially and
substantially interfere[] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school” 6 or would “involve substantial disorder . . . of
the rights of others.” 7 This “substantial disruption” test established a
strong precedent for on campus student speech rights that still applies
today.
The Court has since altered the scope of Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” standard, allowing school administrators to regulate speech

1

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 504.
3
Id. at 504-05.
4
Id. at 509.
5
Id. at 506.
6
Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966))
7
Id.
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when (1) the speech is vulgar, 8 (2) the speech is disseminated through
school resources,9 or (3) the speech promotes illegal drug use. 10
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court upheld a
student’s suspension for “lewd and indecent” speech. 11 A school
suspended Matthew Fraser, a high school senior, for delivering a speech
at an assembly that included an “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor.” 12 The Court distinguished Fraser’s vulgar and lewd speech
from Tinker’s political speech because the former “undermined the
school’s basic educational mission,”13 which includes instilling in students
the “habits and manners of civility” necessary to be productive citizens. 14
Thus, Fraser established an exception to Tinker’s “substantial disruption
or material interference” test, granting schools deference to regulate lewd
and indecent speech occurring at school. 15
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the
Court held that a school may exercise greater editorial control of a schoolsponsored newspaper to ensure that it presents students with material
suitable for their maturity level. 16 In Kuhlmeier, a high school principal
removed two student articles from the school newspaper, one discussing
teenage pregnancy and the other dealing with divorce. 17 Three students
sued, claiming the principal’s censorship violated their First Amendment
rights.18 In its analysis, the Court rejected the idea that a school-sponsored
newspaper was a public forum. 19 It then distinguished the issue from
Tinker, framing the question as whether the First Amendment required a
school to promote, rather than merely tolerate, particular student speech.20
The Court answered its inquiry in the negative, focusing on the school’s
right to editorial control over its official newspaper. 21 In doing so, the
Court did not apply either of the Tinker prongs in its analysis.22

8

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
10
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402 (2007).
11
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
12
Id. at 678.
13
Id. at 685.
14
Id. at 681.
15
Id. at 685.
16
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
17
Id. at 263.
18
Id. at 264.
19
Id. at 269.
20
Id. at 270–71.
21
Id. at 273.
22
Id. at 272–73.
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The Court most recently altered the scope of Tinker in Morse v.
Frederick, expanding school administrators’ authority to regulate speech
occurring off-campus. 23 In Morse, a school suspended a student for
displaying a banner on a school field trip that his principal believed was
advocating illegal drug use. 24 The Court upheld the suspension, finding
that a school’s choice to censor drug-related speech did not constitute an
abstract desire to avoid controversy. 25 The Court’s ruling thus created a
second categorical exception to Tinker’s protection: “promoting illegal
drug use.” 26 Notably, in its holding, the Court expanded the geographic
scope of school administrators’ authority beyond the physical schoolhouse
gate itself, concluding that the circumstances of the field trip amounted to
the student being at school. 27
These four cases comprise the core of student speech First
Amendment doctrine. Tinker first established the broad protection to
students with the “substantial disruption and material interference” test.28
The Court has created two content-based exceptions to Tinker’s
protection—vulgar speech and speech advocating drug use—where
schools have far greater regulatory authority. Furthermore, the Court has
expanded a school’s authority regarding school-sponsored expression and
to off-campus school-related events.

B. The Circuit Courts Apply Tinker in the Modern Age
In the modern age, the ubiquitous use of social media coupled with
the popularity of cell phones has spawned a growing and inconsistent body
of law regarding First Amendment protection of off-campus student
speech. The Supreme Court has yet to affirm that Tinker is applicable to
speech originating outside the school setting, and if so, to what extent.
Consequently, the lower courts have sought to define the circumstances in
which schools may regulate off-campus student speech. Although the
specific language differs amongst the circuits, the resulting tests for
whether schools may regulate off-campus speech fall in two categories:
proximity thresholds and safety thresholds.

23

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007).
Id. at 401.
25
Id. at 408–409.
26
Id. at 400.
27
Id. at 400–01. The Court considered the student to be at school because he was
at an event that occurred during school hours with teachers in attendance, that
included a performance by the school’s band and cheerleaders, and where he was
visible to fellow classmates. Id.
28
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
24
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1. Proximity Thresholds
Proximity thresholds seek to qualify the relationship between the
speech in question and the school. When speech occurs at school, Tinker
governs. The further removed the speech is from the school, the more
difficult it is to justify the speech as falling under the school’s scope of
authority. Several circuit courts have articulated specific analytical
frameworks for assessing the scope of schools’ authority based on the
speech’s proximity to the school grounds, school community, or school
officials.
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School
District, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals extended a school’s
regulatory authority to student speech occurring off-campus and outside
the school setting. 29 In Wisniewski, an eighth-grade student appealed his
suspension for sharing with friends via AOL Instant Messaging from his
home computer an animated icon suggesting that his teacher should be
shot and killed. 30 A concerned classmate informed the targeted teacher,
who shared the image with the school administration, the student’s
parents, and the local police. 31 The student acknowledged that he had
created the image and expressed remorse, but was nevertheless suspended
for five days. 32 In response, the student’s parents brought forth an
unsuccessful suit in the district court. 33 On appeal, the Second Circuit
concluded first that the student’s actions “pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable
risk that the icon would come to the attention of school authorities.” 34 Only
then did it apply Tinker, concluding that the icon would “materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” 35
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its “reasonable foreseeability”
rationale the following year in Doninger v. Niehoff.36 The court upheld
disciplinary action against a student who posted on her personal blog a
derogatory and false message that encouraged readers to contact school
administrators to express dismay over the administrators’ negative
handling of a student event. 37 Citing Wisniewski, the court determined that
not only was it reasonably foreseeable that the student’s post would reach
29

Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d
Cir. 2007).
30
Id. at 35–36.
31
Id. at 36.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 37.
34
Id. at 38.
35
Id. at 39.
36
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
37
Id. at 43–44.
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school property, but it “was purposely designed . . . to come onto the
campus” and “to encourage her fellow students to read and respond.” 38
The court next applied Tinker, finding that the post’s harsh language,39 the
misleading nature of the post, 40 and that the student was a student
government leader all contributed to the likelihood that the post would
“materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school.”41
The Fourth Circuit cited Doninger in a 2011 decision in which it
upheld Kara Kowalski’s suspension for creating a MySpace page
dedicated to bullying and shaming a classmate. 42 Kowalski created the
group and invited roughly 100 classmates on her MySpace “friends” list. 43
Upon discovering the group, the targeted student filed a harassment
complaint, prompting school administrators to suspend Kowalski for
violation of the policy against harassment, bullying, and intimidation. 44
The Fourth Circuit heard Kowalski’s case on appeal to determine whether
her activity fell within the boundaries of the high school’s “legitimate
interest in maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being
and educational rights of its students.”45 While acknowledging the holding
in Doninger, the court used its own analysis:
There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the
order, safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue
originates outside the schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully define
that limit here, as we are satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech
to [the school’s] pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to
justify the action taken by school officials in carrying out their role
as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.46

The court failed to list or set out the factors necessary to show the
sufficiency of a “nexus” between speech and a school’s interests. 47
Furthermore, despite discussing the Second Circuit’s “reasonable
foreseeability” rationale, the Fourth Circuit did not explain if or how the
“nexus” test differed from the “reasonable foreseeability” test, leading

38

Id. at 50.
Id. at 50–51.
40
Id. at 51.
41
Id. at 52.
42
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 568–69.
45
Id. at 571.
46
Id. at 573.
47
Id.
39
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some scholars to conclude that the Fourth Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit’s test using different language. 48
In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit
developed a variation on the “reasonable foreseeability” test that allowed
it to reach a conclusion without deciding whether Tinker applied to offcampus speech.49 In J.S., the Third Circuit found that a school district had
violated a student’s First Amendment rights when it suspended the student
for creating a fake MySpace profile for the school’s principal. 50 The court
concluded that “the profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken
it seriously . . . . Thus, it was clearly not reasonably foreseeable that [the]
speech would create a substantial disruption or material interference in
school.” 51 Unlike the Second Circuit’s test, which first looks to the
reasonable foreseeability of the speech reaching the school before
applying Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test, 52 the Third Circuit looked
instead to the foreseeability of the substantial disruption itself. Because the
student’s act failed this threshold, the court ended its analysis,
“assum[ing], without deciding, that Tinker applie[d] to [the] speech in this
case.”53
In S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District, the Eighth Circuit
ruled in favor of a school district’s 180-day suspension of two brothers for
a disruption caused by their personal website. 54 The students had moved
for a Preliminary Injunction to lift their suspension,55 but the Eight Circuit
reversed the injunction, finding that the students were unlikely to succeed
on the merits.56 The students’ website included a blog that “contained a
variety of offensive and racist comments as well as sexually explicit and
degrading comments about female classmates, whom they identified by
48

Watt Lesley Black, Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the Schoolhouse Gate:
Interpreting Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 531, 551 (2015) (“A
fairly stable consensus has emerged in the case law that Tinker can appropriately
be applied to off-campus student speech . . . . The Second, Fourth, and Eighth
Circuits all considered the question of the reasonable foreseeability that a
student’s off-campus speech would reach the school before extending Tinker to
off-campus speech.”).
49
J.S. ex. rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir.
2011).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
52
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
53
J.S., 650 F.3d at 926.
54
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th
Cir. 2012).
55
Id. at 773.
56
Id. at 776.
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name.” 57 The court looked to Doninger, Kowalski, and J.S. to determine
the scope of the school’s authority. 58 Similar to Kowalski and Doninger,
the blog posts here “could reasonably be expected to reach the school or
impact the environment.” 59 Unlike J.S., the speech here “caused
considerable disturbance and disruption.” 60 Therefore, the court applied
Tinker.61
Except for the Fourth Circuit, the proximity thresholds use
“reasonable foreseeability” tests to examine the proximity between the
speech in question and the school environment. Although these circuits all
use the “reasonable foreseeability” language in their pre-Tinker analysis,
they ask slightly different questions regarding what is reasonably
foreseeable. The various circuits ask whether it is reasonably foreseeable
that the speech “will come to the attention of school authorities,” 62 “will
reach school property,”63 will create “a substantial disruption,” 64 or will “
reach the school or impact the environment.” 65 These differences,
although minimal, have produced inconsistent tests across the circuits.
2. Safety Thresholds
Other circuits have instituted higher threshold requirements that
limit schools’ scope of authority more than the “reasonable foreseeability”
test does. These circuits look not only to the foreseeability that the speech
will reach the school in some form, but also to the content of the speech
itself. As digital speech becomes more common, mere foreseeability that
speech will reach school becomes inevitable. These courts look to the
threatening nature of the speech and the likelihood that the speech will
encroach upon other student’s rights of safety and security at school.
In Wynar v. Douglas County School District,66 the Ninth Circuit
held that school administrators had the authority to discipline a student
who sent “a string of increasingly violent and threatening instant messages
57

Id. at 773.
Id. at 777–78.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 778.
61
Id.
62
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d.
Cir. 2007).
63
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
64
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir.
2011)
65
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th
Cir. 2012).
66
Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
58
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. . . bragging about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates,
[and] intimating that he would ‘take out’ other people at a school shooting
on a specific date.” 67 In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
decisions of its sister circuits to clarify the various threshold tests. 68 In the
Ninth Circuit’s view, Doninger, Kowalski, and S.J.W. had established
different thresholds as prerequisites to applying Tinker,69 while the Third
Circuit and, in a case not involving digital speech, the Fifth Circuit, had
“left open the question whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech.”70
After its review of the current landscape, the Ninth Circuit
declined to adopt any of the other circuits’ reasoning, noting its hesitation
to create a “one-size fits all approach.” 71 Instead, the court grounded its
reasoning in the threatening content of the student’s speech, holding that
“when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may
take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that meets the
requirements of Tinker.”72 The Ninth Circuit deviated further from other
circuits by analyzing the threatening speech under the “invasion of the
rights of others” prong of Tinker. 73 Although the court declined to
elaborate on the exact scope of these rights, it concluded that the threats of
a school shooting “represent the quintessential harm to the rights of other
students to be secure.” 74
The Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Bell v. Itawamba County
School Board upheld a school board’s authority to discipline a student for
recording a threatening rap song outside of school and posting it on his

67

Id. at 1065–66.
Id. at 1068.
69
Id. at 1068–69 (“The Fourth Circuit requires that the speech have a sufficient
‘nexus’ to the school, while the Eighth Circuit requires that it be ‘reasonably
foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community.’ The Second Circuit
has not decided ‘whether it must be shown that it was reasonably foreseeable that
[the speech] would reach the school property or whether the undisputed fact that
it did reach the school pretermits any inquiry as to this aspect of reasonable
foreseeability.’ But at least where it is reasonably foreseeable that off-campus
speech meeting the Tinker test will wind up at school, the Second Circuit has
permitted schools to impose discipline based on the speech.”).
70
Id. at 1069. (“The Third Circuit “assumed, without deciding, that Tinker
applie[d]” to a student’s creation of a parody MySpace profile mocking the school
principal, but held that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the speech would
create a substantial disruption.”). Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1071–72.
74
Id. at 1072.
68
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Facebook page.75 The song contained obscene language and accused two
high school coaches by name of sexually harassing female students. 76 The
lyrics alluded to potential violent acts against those coaches. 77 After a
hearing, the school board’s disciplinary committee found that the song had
constituted “harassment [or] intimidation of []teachers, in violation of
school policy,” and imposed several punishments. 78 The case eventually
reached the Fifth Circuit’s en banc panel, which held that the school board
had not violated the student’s First Amendment rights. 79
In conducting its analysis, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that five
of the six circuits to address the scope of a school’s authority had
determined that Tinker could apply to speech that originated and was
disseminated off-campus.80 It then expressed its hesitation, similar to the
Ninth Circuit, to “adopt any rigid standard” regarding a school’s scope of
authority. 81 Instead, the court established a test sufficient to address the
facts in Bell.82 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Tinker applies to a
student’s off-campus speech when (1) “a student intentionally directs
[speech] at the school community,” 83 and (2) the speech is “reasonably
understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a
teacher.” 84 The first prong of this test resembles the reasonable
foreseeability test. The second prong, however, looks to the content of the
75

Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 383–84.
77
See id. at 384 (“At the very least, this incredibly profane and vulgar rap
recording had at least four instances of threatening, harassing, and intimidating
language against the two coaches:
1. ‘betta watch your back / I'm a serve this [n****], like I serve the
junkies with some crack’;
2. ‘Run up on T–Bizzle / I'm going to hit you with my rueger’;
3. ‘you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a pistol down your
mouth / Boww’; and
4. ‘middle fingers up if you want to cap that [n****]/ middle fingers up
/ he get no mercy [n****]’.”).
78
Id. at 386.
79
Id. at 399.
80
Id. at 393–94. The majority concluded that the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits had applied Tinker in these circumstances, while the Third
Circuit was unclear on the issue. Notably, despite the Ninth Circuit’s express
hesitance to adopt another circuit’s test or to create its own test, the Bell majority
interpreted its ruling in Wynar to apply Tinker. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit
included itself in the tally, despite having not yet ruled on this exact issue.
81
Id. at 396.
82
Id. at 395–96.
83
Id. at 396.
84
Id.
76
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student’s speech to determine if Tinker applies. Given the “threatening
content” threshold, it is hard to imagine a situation in which a student’s
speech would satisfy both prongs, but then fail under Tinker. In Bell,
having found that the student’s song satisfied both prongs of this test, the
court then conducted its Tinker analysis, finding that, in this case, it was
reasonable for school officials to conclude that the song would cause a
substantial disruption. 85 Notably, the court did not define “threatening,”
“harassing,” or “intimidating” language, which one dissenting judge
criticized, opining that the test was unconstitutionally vague.86
While the Ninth and Fifth Circuits deviated from the “reasonable
foreseeability” line of cases, their respective tests naturally incorporate the
“reasonable foreseeability” analysis, since threatening or harassing
language directed at the school community is likely to reach its target. In
essence, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ test imposes another, limiting
threshold before conducting a Tinker analysis.

II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES IN AND OUT
OF THE SCHOOL SETTING
Part I traced the current legal landscape of the scope of schools’
authority over off-campus speech. Although the circuit courts’ respective
cases are modern, with Bell decided as recently as 2015, the technological
landscape has transformed since then. 87 Most notably, both the prevalence
and capabilities of cell phones have increased in recent years, allowing the
vast majority of students to remain plugged in to their social networks
throughout the school day. As cell phones increase the ease of
connectedness, the scope of schools’ authority over off-campus digital
speech rises, since the “reasonable foreseeability” barriers become easier
to breach. This regulatory power, however, butts up against students’
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. Part II traces the
boundaries of students’ Fourth Amendment rights and summarizes a
recent Supreme Court case that Part III argues should guide where cell
phones fall within those boundaries.

85

Id. at 400.
Id. at 413–16 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
87
See, e.g., Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.
pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (“The vast majority of Americans – 95% –
now own a cellphone of some kind. The share of Americans that own smartphones
is now 77%, up from just 35% in Pew Research Center’s first survey of
smartphone ownership conducted in 2011.”).
86
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A. New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Establishing a Standard for School
Searches
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of school
officials searching students’ belongings in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 88 In
T.L.O., a high school student claimed her Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when the school’s vice principal searched her purse.89 A teacher
had seen the student smoking a cigarette in a school bathroom and reported
the student to the vice principal. 90 The student denied smoking, which
prompted the vice principal to search the purse, where he found cigarettes
and rolling papers he believed were for smoking marijuana.91
The Court held that the search was constitutional, 92 reaffirming
that the legality of any search depends “on [its] reasonableness under all
the circumstances.” 93 Testing the reasonableness, the Court balanced
students’ expectations of privacy in their personal items against school
officials’ interest in searching these belongings. 94 The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was “unsuited to the school
environment” because requiring a teacher to get a warrant before searching
a student’s belongings “would interfere with the maintenance of the swift
and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” 95 In its place,
the Court established a two-step test for testing the reasonableness of a
search in the school setting. 96 For a search to be reasonable, it must be (1)
“justified at its inception,”97 and be (2) “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference.” 98 Moreover, the measures
adopted by the school cannot be “excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” 99 As applied, the
teacher’s eyewitness testimony justified the search at its inception and in
its scope, since the vice principal reasonably believed the search of her
purse would produce evidence of school misconduct, and because students

88

469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 328.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 340.
93
Id. at 341.
94
Id. at 337.
95
Id. at 330–31.
96
Id. at 341.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 342.
89
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do not have a strong expectation of privacy as to bookbags and purses
while at school.100

B. Safford United School District v. Redding: Defining the Limits
for School Searches
In Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the Court held
that a strip search of a thirteen-year-old student accused of hiding pills on
her person was invasive enough to tip the balance against the
reasonableness of the search. 101 Administrators suspected that the student
was distributing prescription drugs to other students, so the they directed
the school nurse to search her bra and expose her underwear.102 The Court
applied T.L.O.’s “reasonable suspicion” test to the facts, finding that the
search was justified at its inception because the principal had heard the
student was distributing pills to students. 103 However, the scope of the
search—pulling away a young girl’s underwear—was not appropriate
given the important societal expectations of personal privacy as to this
layer of clothing.104 The Court ultimately concluded that the “combination
of . . . deficiencies [were] fatal to finding the search reasonable.” 105

C. Riley v. California: Recognizing the Cell Phone’s Status in the
Privacy Debate
In 2014, the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision in a
digital privacy case, Riley v. California, holding that police must obtain a
warrant to search the contents of cell phones confiscated during an
arrest. 106 Police may only search an arrestee’s person and immediate
surroundings.107 This search “incident to arrest” exception to the warrant
requirement exists both to ensure officer safety while a suspect is being
apprehended and to prevent the suspect from destroying any evidence
within reach.108 The Supreme Court has held that the warrant requirement
100

Id. at 346.
557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 375–76.
104
Id. at 369.
105
Id. at 377.
106
134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
107
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969) (establishing the it is
reasonable for police officers to search the arrestee’s person and the area within
the arrestee’s immediate control); See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235–236 (1973) (permitting search of closed cigarette package found on
arrestee’s person); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, (1981) (holding police
may search that are within arrestee’s reach).
108
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63.
101
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may be dispensed with only when the underlying justifications for the
exception apply to the specific situation. 109
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether the
digital content on an arrestee’s cell phone falls within the scope of the
search “incident to arrest” exception. 110 David Riley was pulled over by
police for driving with expired registration tags. 111 Because Riley had a
suspended driver’s license, the police impounded the car and performed a
standard inventory search. 112 During that search, the police found two
illegal firearms and subsequently arrested Riley. 113 Riley had his cell
phone on his person at the time of the arrest, and a detective searched
through its contents and found videos of Riley making gang signs, along
with photos of Riley standing in front of a vehicle involved in a recent
shooting. 114 This evidence prompted additional charges including
shooting at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semi-automatic firearm,
and attempted murder. 115 Riley moved to suppress the photographic
evidence taken from his phone, arguing that the warrantless search of his
phone violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 116
The Court acknowledged the lack of “precise guidance from the
founding era” as to whether modern cell phones may be searched without
a warrant. 117 Thus, the Court instead applied the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness balancing test, weighing the government’s interest in the
search against the privacy interests of arrestees, to determine if the search
was constitutional. 118
The Court found the governmental interests to be minimal, noting
that the underlying justifications for the search incident to arrest exception
are not generally applicable to digital content on a phone. 119 The Court
first found that the content on the phone could not be used to harm the
officers, and thus it did not pose a safety threat. 120 Second, the Court

109

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 (2009).
134 S.Ct. at 2482 (2014).
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reasoned that, once the officers had possession of the phone, there was no
risk that the suspect would destroy its digital contents.121
The Court next considered the privacy interests at stake in a cell
phone search. 122 Although arrestees have a diminished expectation of
privacy, the Court found that the unique privacy-related concerns of cell
phones justified a warrant requirement. 123 “Modern cell phones,” the
Court noted, “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by
the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.” 124 The Court clarified
that the term “cell phone” is a misnomer, declaring instead that these
“microcomputers” combine the functions of “cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions,
maps, [and] newspapers.” 125 Thus, the “sum of an individual’s private life
can be reconstructed” through the totality of a phone’s detailed contents. 126
The Court further noted the immense storage capacity allows one to find
data extending back to the phone’s purchase. 127 In its analysis, the Court
addressed the nuances of cloud computing, stating that accessing suspects’
remote storage content through their phones “would be like finding a key
in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed [them] to unlock and
search a house.” 128 Considering all the privacy interests at risk, the balance
tipped heavily in favor of the suspect’s privacy rights. This extensive
exploration of cell phone privacy interests in Riley serves to justify its
application to the school setting in Part III.

III. RILEY’S APPLICABILITY TO THE SCHOOL SETTING
The Riley Court’s broad pronouncements about the unique privacy
concerns raised by cell phones should inform future cases involving
cellphone searches in the school setting. Much of the Court’s rationale
applies directly or by analogy to the school setting. Both students and
arrestees have diminished expectations of privacy, but both parties should
still retain a substantial privacy interest in their digital cell phone data.

121

Id. In its argument, the government posited that information on a cell phone is
vulnerable to two types of evidence destruction: remote wiping and data
encryption. The Court dismissed these concerns, downplaying their prevalence,
and providing examples of reasonable responses to these concerns. Id. at 2486–
88.
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Id. at 2487.
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Id. at 2493.
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Id. at 2488–89.
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Moreover, applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test used in
Riley would lead to the same result in the school setting.
Although students have a diminished expectation of privacy
compared to the general public, 129 Riley suggests that the privacy interests
at stake can be great enough to tip the balance in favor of those with
decreased privacy expectations. 130 The Court has consistently held that
school children have a lesser expectation of privacy than that of the general
population.131 When parents send their children to school, they delegate
some authority to the school.132 Furthermore, public schools as state actors
exercise a certain degree of control and supervision as part of their
custodial duty, curtailing public school students’ constitutional rights in
the school setting.133
However, the privacy rights highlighted in Riley were not merely
“general population” privacy rights that must be pared down to apply to
the school setting. Like students in the school setting, David Riley also
experienced a diminished expectation of privacy because of his status as
an arrestee. The Court has long recognized a decreased expectation of
privacy of an arrestee’s person. 134 Guiding this recognition was the
concern for officer safety and evidence preservation, or put more broadly,
the need for police to exercise reasonable control over the environment,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (“While we do
not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter have such a degree
of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect,’ we
have acknowledged that for many purposes ‘school authorities ac[t] in loco
parentis,’ with the power and indeed the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners
of civility.’”) (citations omitted).
130
134 S.Ct. at at 2497.
131
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 656–57; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 348 (1985)).
132
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 656 (1995) (“Fourth Amendment rights,
no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public
schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”).
133
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“We have
nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in the public
schools ‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings,’ and must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.’”) (citations omitted).
134
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“It is well settled
that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”); id. at 260 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I
believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.”).
129
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similar to the goal of school administrators. 135 Despite this need, the Court
held that the privacy-related concerns were weighty enough to require a
warrant to search the contents of a cell phone.136 Indeed, even though the
police could lawfully confiscate Riley’s phone, he retained his privacy in
the digital contents of the phone separate from the physical object itself. 137
Similarly, while students routinely have their physical phones confiscated
due to their diminished sense of privacy in school, that in no way
diminishes the expectation that the contents will remain private. Because
the privacy concerns that students have in their cell phone data equals that
of the general population, Riley suggests that students do not lose privacy
rights in their cell phone data simply because of their status as students.
In Riley, the Court acknowledged both the newness and
pervasiveness of modern cell phones. 138 Without a founding era
equivalent, the Court could not rely on specific historical guidance,
although it highlighted the historical concerns of general warrants in the
colonial era. 139 It instead turned to the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness balancing test to assess the constitutionality of a cell phone
search, weighing the degree of intrusion against the legitimate
governmental interests. 140 The lack of founding era guidance on cell
phones remains the same in all settings, suggesting that the reasonableness
test should also control cell phone searches in the school setting. 141 Indeed,
schools apply the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness balancing test to
searches in other contexts, 142 and thus would maintain consistency by
applying it to cell phones searches.
School searches must be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference.” 143 However, the Riley
135

Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484.
Id. at 2495.
137
Id. at 2485.
138
See id. at 2484 (“cell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.”).
139
See id. at 2494. “Our cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment was
the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of
assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through
homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity. Opposition to
such searches was in fact one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself.”
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Id.
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Id.
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See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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Redding, 557 U.S. at 375 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S., at 341).
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Court rejected the government’s proposal that warrantless cell phone
searches be permitted, but limited to specific areas of the phone, 144 a
restriction akin to the requirement that school officials’ searches be
“reasonable in scope.” Its rationale stemmed from its earlier recognition
that cell phones store a wide variety of easily accessible personal
information, leading to a greater potential for the intermingling of
information and, consequently, an invasion of privacy that exceeds the
scope of the specific circumstances. 145 In doing so, the Court expressed
doubts that officers could discern exactly where information was located
without accidentally uncovering other private information. 146 For
example, in the school context, a principal might have to search through a
digital photo album to find a specific photo or through an entire text
message thread to find a specific text. In T.L.O., the Court assumed that
school officials could search carefully through the contents of physical
belongings to limit the scope of their intrusion, 147 but the complexity of
cell phones undercuts this assumption. Indeed, some scholars align a
search of cell phone data closer with that of a strip search such as that in
Safford, given the potential to uncover sensitive information. 148
Riley’s application to the school setting becomes problematic
when considering its remedial solution. Riley’s holding dictates that cell
phone data does not fall within the “incident to arrest” exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 149 While one possible
procedure in the school setting is to require school administrators to
request warrants, this solution would be impractical. The Court has stated
that “the warrant requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment”
because it would “unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and
informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”150 Thus, although
144

134 S.Ct. at 2492.
Id. at 2485.
146
See id. at 2492. (“This approach would again impose few meaningful
constraints on officers. The proposed categories would sweep in a great deal of
information, and officers would not always be able to discern in advance what
information would be found where.”).
147
See 469 U.S. at 343 (“By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness,
the standard will . . . permit [teachers and school administrators] to regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.”).
148
See Bernard James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart
Devices After Riley v. California, 101 IOWA L. REV. 343, 354 (2015) (“One must
logically conclude that the higher-order privacy interest of students to resist a strip
search is equal to (if not greater than) the higher expectation of privacy students
now possess in the digital contents of their cell phones.”).
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Riley, 134 S.Ct.at 2495 (2014).
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T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 340.
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the heightened privacy concerns and the diminished privacy expectations
are similar between arrestees and students, the unique discipline
mechanisms in the school environment require a different procedure than
the warrant standard in Riley.151

IV. HOW CELL PHONES UNDERMINE THE POST-TINKER
OFF-CAMPUS DOCTRINE
Both cell phones and the developing body of law surrounding their
regulation in the school setting have the potential to disrupt the off-campus
speech tests discussed in Part I. The argument in favor of recognizing
students’ higher privacy expectations in their digital cell phone data
extends beyond Fourth Amendment concerns. The conversations had, and
the photos taken on cell phones constitute protected expression against
government interference. Because students’ phones contain expressive
contents that would fall under the First Amendment’s protection in a nonschool situation, the T.L.O. reasonableness balance should tip to support a
higher privacy expectation. This conclusion, however, depends in part on
whether such digital contents are afforded First Amendment protection
from school officials. That question depends upon the various circuit court
tests for off-campus school speech regulation. Although these tests were
developed within the past decade, the ubiquity of cell phone use among
students is even more recent and threatens to undermine the assumptions
on which these tests were based. 152 As Part I discussed, these tests fall into
two general categories: (1) “proximity thresholds” and (2) “safety
thresholds.”
Proximity thresholds have quickly become obsolete in an age
where all digital speech can be accessed at any time, including while at
school. 153 Continuing to uphold “reasonable foreseeability” tests will
ultimately extend a school’s scope of authority to regulate speech to all
aspects of a student’s life. If school officials were looking for a source of
151

See infra Part V, proposing one such procedure.
See, e.g., Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015,
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teenssocial-media-technology-2015/ (“Some 88% of teens have or have access to cell
phones or smartphones and 90% of those teens with phones exchange texts. A
typical teen sends and receives 30 texts per day.”).
153
Donna St. George, Schools and cellphones: In elementary schools? At lunch?,
WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/schools-and-cellphones-in-elementary-schools-atlunch/2017/11/13/
1061064a-ba81-11e7-a908a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.3569880f6ae5
(“Students are supposed to use the district’s network while in school, and social
media sites in Montgomery are blocked for -middle-schoolers, although some
break the rules and go off the network to access them. High school students can
use Facebook and Twitter through the network.”).
152
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“reasonableness” to search a student’s cell phone, the “reasonable
foreseeability” test provides near carte blanche justification for these
searches of any student who communicates through a cell phone.
Unless a strict application of Riley were to apply to the school
setting, proximity tests would allow school officials to intrude upon
students’ privacy interests to regulate any form of digital expression
accessible by phone, regardless of where or when it was expressed, so long
as it had any potential to interfere within the school environment. While
minimizing interference is an important policy goal, this overbroad power
has the potential to invite even more interference than it would deter.
Although cell phones contain multitudes of private information and
expression, students do not consciously bring every private
communication or expression to the school community when they bring
the physical phone on campus. This broad application would inevitably
chill protected speech and extend the supervisory role of the state far
beyond the limits of the schoolhouse gate, infringing on students’ First
Amendment rights.
The safety thresholds used by the Fifth and Ninth circuits create a
heightened standard for defining a school’s scope of authority over offcampus student speech. However, the standards in their current form are
too vague. The “identifiable threat” test developed in Wynar permits a
more limited yet vague set of circumstances in which school officials may
regulate student speech. Although the Ninth Circuit considered the danger
of school shootings and the school’s duty to maintain a safe environment
when limiting Tinker to on-campus speech,154 it did not elaborate on the
threats or violence covered. The test is thus ambiguous as to the scope of
the school’s reach. Serious and immediate threats of physical harm such
as those in Wynar seem to fall within this scope, but less overt forms of
violence such as cyberbullying remain unclear. Arguably, if a victim
presented evidence of one-on-one cyberbullying from his or her own
phone, there would be no need to search the other’s phone. However,
because cyberbullying can take many forms, 155 consensual third-party
disclosure may not be possible in all cases. 156 The Fifth Circuit’s test
154

Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2013).
See What is Cyberbullying?, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL,
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018); What is cyberbullying exactly? STOP CYBERBULLYING,
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
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See Corinne David-Ferdon & Marci Feldman Hertz, Electronic Media and
Youth Violence: A CDC Issue Brief for Researchers, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL at 6 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/electronic
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suffers from the same vagueness concerns, failing to define the
“threatening,” “harassing,” or “intimidating” language that is required
before applying Tinker.157
This presents a separate procedural issue that the court
acknowledged, but failed to rule on definitively. 158 With safety thresholds,
the initial hurdles are arguably more heightened than Tinker itself. Indeed,
speech that could pose an identifiable threat to the safety of students would
also foreseeably reach the school community and would also substantially
disrupt or materially interfere with the school environment. Thus, if the
initial threshold is met, the Tinker threshold is also met. This suggests, as
Part V argues, that Tinker may not be the most suitable avenue for
regulating serious threats made off-campus.

V. A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION
A. Abolish Threshold Tests and Create a Third, Limited
Categorical Exception to Protected Student Speech
The threshold tests developed by the various circuit courts suffer
from inconsistency, vagueness, and, for some, irrelevance in the modern
age. Schools should expect that nearly all student speech will foreseeably
reach the school setting. Thus, schools cannot rely on a geographical nexus
without eradicating Tinker and extending school regulation to all facets of
a student’s social life.
Instead, courts should abandon the outdated threshold tests and
establish a third, narrow categorical exception to Tinker—granting schools
the authority to regulate speech that poses a credible and substantial threat
of physical danger, regardless of its origin. This includes when the speech
severely impedes the ability of another student to enjoy a benefit or
opportunity provided by the school and when the speech jeopardizes the
safety of a member of the school community. This category would allow
schools to regulate threats of violence directed at the school, but would
recognize the limited supervisory role that school officials should play in
a child’s life. Thus, this higher standard would allow for certain forms of
disfavored off-campus speech—such as mockery, criticism, and certain
_aggression_researcher_brief-a.pdf (“[B]etween 13% and 46% of young people
who were victims of electronic aggression reported not knowing their harasser’s
identity. Likewise, 22% of perpetrators of electronic aggression reported not
knowing the identity of their victim.”).
157
See Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 416 (5th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
158
See id. at 397 (“Arguably, a student’s threatening, harassing, and intimidating
a teacher inherently portends a substantial disruption, making feasible a per se
rule in that regard.”).
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unpopular types of creative expression—to fall clearly outside the scope
of school authorities. By limiting the school’s scope of authority to serious
threats posed to the school, this threshold protects students’ First
Amendment rights online and outside of school while still allowing
schools to maintain a safe environment.
This proposed categorical exception to protected speech is not a
radical departure from the Court’s prior decisions; the Court has twice
established categorical content-based exceptions to protected student
speech. In Fraser, the Court held that schools may regulate lewd and
vulgar speech on school grounds without considering the Tinker test to
prevent “undermin[ing] the school’s basic educational mission.” 159 In
Morse, the Court held that schools may regulate speech aimed at
promoting illegal drug use “to safeguard those entrusted to their care.” 160
These categorical exceptions were limited to the school environment, but
the Court in Morse did acknowledge that the school’s environment is not
bound by a geographical limitation.161 These exceptions were grounded in
the need for school officials to act swiftly in the face of a “special danger”
to the unique characteristics of the school environment. 162 Substantial
threats against the safety of students or teachers, whether made in the
hallway or sent from a student’s phone, present a special danger to the
school community.
By creating a limited categorical exception to protected student
speech, the Court can do away with over-inclusive threshold tests that
allow schools to regulate virtually all digital student speech. The Court
would need to define the contours of such an exception and establish some
reasonable objectivity requirement when considering if the speech
constitutes a substantial threat. The lower court cases have provided
examples of speech that could fall within this exception. In Wynar, the
student continually posted violent messages on social media, threatening
to shoot students his school on the anniversary of the Columbine shooting,
describing the gun he would use and contemplating who his victims would
be.163 This speech presented a credible and substantial threat to the school
community. Regardless of the reasonable foreseeability of it reaching the
campus, the school was presented with a special danger it should be able
to address.164
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Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
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Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
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B. Establish a Two-Prong Procedure for Cell Phone Searches that
Arise under the “Substantial Threat” Exception
When presented with evidence of a credible threat, school
administrators should be able to take reasonable measures to uncover the
details of the threat and prevent any danger from occurring. This
exemplifies the first prong in T.L.O.’s reasonableness test—“justification
at inception.” 165 In many cases, threats are communicated digitally,
whether they are posted in a public forum like Facebook or communicated
privately through a one-on-one message.166 Publicly posted threats do not
present the same privacy issues as private communications. 167 Often, the
speech at issue can be brought to the attention of administrators willingly
by concerned students with access to the threatening speech. Private or
semi-private communications present a more difficult situation for
administrators. If, for example, a student shows his classmates photos of
his plan to carry out a school shooting or a document which describes how
to create an explosive device, the direct evidence of a threat never leaves
his phone.
Because of the heightened privacy interests at stake, school
administrators who reasonably believe there is direct evidence of
substantially threatening speech on a student’s cell phone still must afford
the student some due process before searching the phone. Even if Riley’s
warrant requirement does not apply to the school setting, the Court’s
acknowledgement of the privacy risks at stake should require the school
to develop a standard procedure before searching a student’s phone. 168
Specific elements of that standard procedure are recommended below.
1. Obtain Parental Consent
In many cases, the student’s parent is the actual owner of the
phone, and thus could give a school administrator permission to search the
phone if the administrator suspects that the desired information would

165

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
See St. George, supra note 153.
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Social media users have no justifiable expectation that users within their
network will keep posted information private. A larger social media network,
increases the chances that information will be viewed by someone the user never
expected to view it. See Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, 2012 WL 6720752 (E.D.
N.Y. 2012).
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Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (“Modern cell phones are
not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may
reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”).
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cause a substantial threat to the school environment.169 The school could
also allow the parent to be present during the search or to conduct the
search on behalf of the school.
While a parental consent requirement might easily mitigate this
issue, there are several potential problems with this approach. First,
sometimes phones belong to the students themselves. Minors usually
cannot sign up for a cell phone plan, but there is no age restriction on
buying a phone. Moreover, some students aren’t minors, and thus could
both own the phone and contract with the wireless network. Second, not
every parent will give consent for a school official to search their child’s
phone. Although parents and educators ideally work in partnership to
support the child, some parents are more hostile toward school officials or
simply may not want to assist in a disciplinary action. Third, this procedure
assumes that parents are available to come to the school to observe a search
or at least receive a call during the day. This is not the case with many
working parents. If a school administrator could not reach a parent,
presumably the school would retain possession of the phone beyond the
end of the school day, thus depriving the child of a necessary instrument.
Finally, while the parent may own the phone, that technicality does not
diminish the child’s privacy interest in the phone’s contents. The Riley
Court framed cell phone privacy in terms of the vast amount of personal
data and the potential to invade that sense of privacy. 170 Children rely on
a certain degree of privacy regarding their phones, and such a system could
betray their reliance on that understanding of privacy.
2. Documented Internal Review
Despite its flaws, a procedure requiring parental consent allows
for the school to work in tandem with the parents to prevent substantial
threats at school while also providing a check on the school administrator.
Ideally, such a procedure would still be strictly limited in scope to prevent
unnecessary invasions of students’ private data. Administrators who could
not get parental consent could still afford the student due process by
documenting the scope and purpose of the search on a standard form akin
to an administrative warrant. 171
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See Amanda Lenhart et al., Chapter Four: How Parents and Schools Regulate
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(Apr.
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2010),
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Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2489.
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Administrative warrants require a lower standard than criminal warrants and
are “measured against a flexible standard of reasonableness.” See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
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Under this scheme, the school employee seeking information from
a student’s phone would fill out a standard form, detailing the facts and
circumstances justifying the request. The employee would name the
specific apps or folders which he believes might contain the threatening
speech and provide the source of his suspicion.
Before the search, an independent administrator, likely the
principal, should review the document and use his discretion to decide if
the threat is credible and warrants suspicion. After signing off on the
document, the independent administrator would conduct the limited search
in the presence of the reporting employee, the student, and a student
representative. This process assumes that a student would comply, albeit
reluctantly. If the student obstructed this process, such as by refusing to
provide the password to his phone, then further disciplinary procedures
would become necessary.
These solutions present practical policies for raising higher Fourth
Amendment safeguards and protecting students’ right to privacy in their
cell phone data. School boards and state legislatures can incorporate
concerns and ideas voiced by their constituents and craft policies that
recognize students’ rights and school administrators’ interests in
maintaining a safe environment.

CONCLUSION
Without relevant guidance from the courts, school administrators
will be left to navigate a patchwork of vague thresholds to avoid depriving
students of their constitutional rights while maintaining a safe and secure
school community. The unique privacy interests students have in their cell
phones present further problems for schools.
As the splits among the courts of appeals increase, so too will the
pressure on the Supreme Court to resolve the problem of students’ First
Amendment speech rights in the age of cell phones. Until then, the nuances
of these threshold tests will continue to plague students and administrators
alike in the wake of emerging communication technologies. Abolishing
these tests and replacing them with a heightened categorical exception to
the Tinker standard would adhere to the logic of the Supreme Court’s prior
decisions. It would also provide adequate and reasonable notice of the
scope of a school administrator’s authority to regulate students’ offcampus speech and of students’ privacy concerning such speech. Finally,
it would provide the justification required to conduct reasonable searches
in the school setting.

